The Grammar of English Grammars by Goold Brown (free ebook reader .txt) 📕

good definitions; these are the elements of that accuracy and comprehensiveness of thought, to which allusion has been made, and which are characteristic of "the first and highest philosophy."

3. Again, with reference to the cultivation of the mind, I would add: To observe accurately the appearances of things, and the significations of words; to learn first principles first, and proceed onward in such a manner that every new truth may help to enlighten and strengthen the understanding; and thus to comprehend gradually, according to our capacity, whatsoever may be brought within the scope of human intellect:—to do these things, I say, is, to ascend by sure steps, so far as we may, from the simplest elements of science—which, in fact, are our own, original, undefinable notices of things—towards the very topmost height of human wisdom and knowledge. The ancient saying, that truth lies hid, or in the bottom of a well, must not be taken without qualification; for "the first and highest philosophy" has many principles which even a child may understand. These several suggestions, the first of which the Baron de Puffendorf thought not unworthy to introduce his great work on the Law of Nature and of Nations, the reader, if he please, may bear in mind, as he peruses the following digest of the laws and usages of speech.

4. "Definitions," says Duncan, in his Elements of Logic, "are intended to make known the meaning of words standing for complex ideas;[65] and were we always careful to form those ideas exactly in our minds, and copy our definitions from that appearance, much of the confusion and obscurity complained of in languages might be prevented."—P. 70. Again he says: "The writings of the mathematicians are a clear proof, how much the advancement of human knowledge depends upon a right use of definitions."—P. 72. Mathematical science has been supposed to be, in its own nature, that which is best calculated to develop and strengthen the reasoning faculty; but, as speech is emphatically the discourse of reason, I am persuaded, that had the grammarians been equally clear and logical in their instructions, their science would never have been accounted inferior in this respect. Grammar is perhaps the most comprehensive of all studies; but it is chiefly owing to the unskillfulness of instructors, and to the errors and defects of the systems in use, that it is commonly regarded as the most dry and difficult.

5. "Poor Scaliger (who well knew what a definition should be) from his own melancholy experience exclaimed—'Nihil infelicius grammatico definitore!' Nothing is more unhappy than the grammatical definer."—Tooke's Diversions, Vol. i, p. 238. Nor do our later teachers appear to have been more fortunate in this matter. A majority of all the definitions and rules contained in the great multitude of English grammars which I have examined, are, in some respect or other, erroneous. The nature of their multitudinous faults, I must in general leave to the discernment of the reader, except the passages be such as may be suitably selected for examples of false syntax. Enough, however, will be exhibited, in the course of this volume, to make the foregoing allegation credible; and of the rest a more accurate judgement may perhaps be formed, when they shall have been compared with what this work will present as substitutes. The importance of giving correct definitions to philological terms, and of stating with perfect accuracy whatsoever is to be learned as doctrine, has never been duly appreciated. The grand source of the disheartening difficulties encountered by boys in the study of grammar, lies in their ignorance of the meaning of words. This cause of embarrassment is not to be shunned and left untouched; but, as far as possible, it ought to be removed. In teaching grammar, or indeed any other science, we cannot avoid the use of many terms to which young learners may have attached no ideas. Being little inclined or accustomed to reflection, they often hear, read, or even rehearse from memory, the plainest language that can be uttered, and yet have no very distinct apprehension of what it means. What marvel then, that in a study abounding with terms taken in a peculiar or technical sense, many of which, in the common manuals, are either left undefined, or are explained but loosely or erroneously, they should often be greatly puzzled, and sometimes totally discouraged?

6. Simple ideas are derived, not from teaching, but from sensation or consciousness; but complex ideas, or the notions which we have of such things as consist of various parts, or such as stand in any known relations, are definable. A person can have no better definition of heat, or of motion, than what he will naturally get by moving towards a fire. Not so of our complex or general ideas, which constitute science. The proper objects of scientific instruction consist in those genuine perceptions of pure mind, which form the true meaning of generic names, or common nouns; and he who is properly qualified to teach, can for the most part readily tell what should be understood by such words. But are not many teachers too careless here? For instance: a boy commencing the process of calculation, is first told, that, "Arithmetic is the art of computing by numbers," which sentence he partly understands; but should he ask his teacher, "What is a number, in arithmetic?" what answer will he get? Were Goold Brown so asked, he would simply say, "A number, in arithmetic, is an expression that tells how many;" for every expression that tells how many, is a number in arithmetic, and nothing else is. But as no such definition is contained in the books,[66] there are ten chances to one, that, simple as the matter is, the readiest master you shall find, will give an erroneous answer. Suppose the teacher should say, "That is a question which I have not thought of; turn to your dictionary." The boy reads from Dr. Webster: "NUMBER—the designation of a unit in reference to other units, or in reckoning, counting, enumerating."—"Yes," replies the master, "that is it; Dr. Webster is unrivalled in giving definitions." Now, has the boy been instructed, or only puzzled? Can he conceive how the number five can be a unit? or how the word five, the figure 5, or the numeral letter V, is "the designation of a unit?" He knows that each of these is a number, and that the oral monosyllable five is the same number, in an other form; but is still as much at a loss for a proper answer to his question, as if he had never seen either schoolmaster or dictionary. So is it with a vast number of the simplest things in grammar.

7. Since what we denominate scientific terms, are seldom, if ever, such as stand for ideas simple and undefinable; and since many of those which represent general ideas, or classes of objects, may be made to stand for more or fewer things, according to the author's notion of classification; it is sufficiently manifest that the only process by which instruction can effectually reach the understanding of the pupil and remove the difficulties spoken of, is that of delivering accurate definitions. These are requisite for the information and direction of the learner; and these must be thoroughly impressed upon his mind, as the only means by which he can know exactly how much and what he is to understand by our words. The power which we possess, of making known all our complex or general ideas of things by means of definitions, is a faculty wisely contrived in the nature of language, for the increase and spread of science; and, in the hands of the skillful, it is of vast avail to these ends. It is "the first and highest philosophy," instructing mankind, to think clearly and speak accurately; as well as to know definitely, in the unity and permanence of a general nature, those things which never could be known or spoken of as the individuals of an infinite and fleeting multitude.

8. And, without contradiction, the shortest and most successful way of teaching the young mind to distinguish things according to their proper differences, and to name or describe them aright, is, to tell in direct terms what they severally are. Cicero intimates that all instruction appealing to reason ought to proceed in this manner: "Omnis enim quse à ratione suscipitur de re aliqua institutio, debet à definitione proficisci, ut intelligatur quid sit id, de quo disputetur."—Off. Lib. i, p. 4. Literally thus: "For all instruction which from reason is undertaken concerning any thing, ought to proceed from a definition, that it may be understood what the thing is, about which the speaker is arguing." Little advantage, however, will be derived from any definition, which is not, as Quintilian would have it, "Lucida et succincta rei descriptio,"—"a clear and brief description of the thing."

9. Let it here be observed that scientific definitions are of things, and not merely of words; or if equally of words and things, they are rather of nouns than of the other parts of speech. For a definition, in the proper sense of the term, consists not in a mere change or explanation of the verbal sign, but in a direct and true answer to the question, What is such or such a thing? In respect to its extent, it must with equal exactness include every thing which comes under the name, and exclude every thing which does not come under the name: then will it perfectly serve the purpose for which it is intended. To furnish such definitions, (as I have suggested,) is work for those who are capable of great accuracy both of thought and expression. Those who would qualify themselves for teaching any particular branch of knowledge, should make it their first concern to acquire clear and accurate ideas of all things that ought to be embraced in their instructions. These ideas are to be gained, either by contemplation upon the things themselves as they are presented naturally, or by the study of those books in which they are rationally and clearly explained. Nor will such study ever be irksome to him whose generous desire after knowledge, is thus deservedly gratified.

10. But it must be understood, that although scientific definitions are said to be of things, they are not copied immediately from the real essence of the things, but are formed from the conceptions of the author's mind concerning that essence. Hence, as Duncan justly remarks, "A mistaken idea never fails to occasion a mistake also in the definition." Hence, too, the common distinction of the logicians, between definitions of the name and definitions of the thing, seems to have little or no foundation. The former term they applied to those definitions which describe the objects of pure intellection, such as triangles, and other geometrical figures; the latter, to those which define objects actually existing in external nature. The mathematical definitions, so noted for their certainty and completeness, have been supposed to have some peculiar preëminence, as belonging to the former class. But, in fact the idea of a triangle exists as substantively in the mind, as that of a tree, if not indeed more so; and if I define these two objects, my description will, in either case, be equally a definition both of the name and of the thing; but in neither, is it copied from any thing else than that notion which I have conceived, of the common properties of all triangles or of all trees.

11. Infinitives, and some other terms not called nouns, may be taken abstractly or substantively, so as to admit of what may be considered a regular definition; thus the question, "What is it to read?" is nearly the same as, "What is reading?" "What is it to be wise?" is little different from, "What is wisdom?" and a true answer might be, in either case, a true definition. Nor are those mere translations or explanations of words, with which our dictionaries and vocabularies abound, to be dispensed with in teaching: they prepare the student to read various authors with facility, and furnish him with a better choice of terms, when he attempts to write. And in making such choice, let him remember, that as affectation of hard words makes composition ridiculous, so the affectation of easy and common ones may make it unmanly. But not to digress. With respect to grammar, we must sometimes content ourselves with such explications of its customary terms, as cannot claim to be perfect definitions; for the most common and familiar things are not always those which it is the most easy to define. When Dr. Johnson was asked, "What is poetry?" he replied, "Why, sir, it is easier to tell what it is not. We all know what light is: but it is not easy to tell what it is."—Boswell's Life of Johnson, Vol. iii, p. 402. This was thought