PrroBooks.com » Literary Collections » Practical Argumentation by George K. Pattee (books for new readers .txt) 📕

Book online «Practical Argumentation by George K. Pattee (books for new readers .txt) 📕». Author George K. Pattee



1 ... 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ... 38
argument, refutation according to the second and third methods might read about as follows: “The contention of the affirmative that the eighty-five per cent. rule should be adopted because it would result in an intellectual improvement among college students, rests on the supposition that students would study harder during the term, and for that reason would more thoroughly master their subjects. This reasoning is erroneous because, in the first place, as I will show, but very few students, if any, would study harder during the term; and, in the second place, even if they did, those exempted would not have mastered their work so completely at the end of the year as they would have if they had taken an examination.”

From the preceding, it is apparent that refutation consists of discrediting evidence and attacking reasoning. The ways to overthrow evidence will be considered first.

 

EVIDENCE.

It is taken for granted that the evidence mustered by the opponent is sufficient, if not overthrown, to establish his side of the discussion. Of course, if enough evidence for this purpose is lacking, one has only to call attention to this fundamental weakness in order to overthrow the argument then and there. The rules, therefore, for testing evidence assume that the opponent has cited facts that, if not combated, will establish his case.

These tests are the same as those given in Chapter VI; a hasty review of them, however, may be serviceable at this point.

I. Tests of the sources of evidence.

A. Is the witness competent to give a trustworthy account of the matter?

B. Is the witness willing to give an accurate account?

1. Does he have any personal interest in the case?

C. Is the witness prejudiced?

D. Does the witness have a good reputation for honesty and accuracy?

II. Internal tests of evidence.

A. Is the evidence consistent (a) with itself, (b) with known facts, (c) with human experience?

B. Is it first-hand evidence?

C. Can the evidence be classed as especially valuable?

1. Does it consist of hurtful admissions?

2. Is it undesigned evidence?

3. Is it negative evidence?

III. Test of argument from authority.

A. Is the witness an acknowledged authority on the subject about which he testifies?

To overthrow or weaken argument from authority, one may either discredit its source or bring to light some inconsistency in the statement itself. Usually the former method alone is possible. To accomplish this result, one may show that the witness spoke from insufficient knowledge of the matter, or was prejudiced, or had some personal interest in the case. Counter authority will also be of assistance. The following quotation taken from a college debate furnishes the student a good example of how to handle this sort of refutation.

“The argument has been advanced that the South does not need the foreign laborer, and this argument has been supported by the words of Mr. Prescott F. Hall. We would call the attention of the audience and the judges to the fact that since Prescott F. Hall is Secretary of the Immigration Restriction League, it would be to his interest to make this assertion. Why do not our opponents refer to impartial and unprejudiced men, men like Dr. Allen McLaughlin, a United States immigration official, who makes just the opposite statement?”

 

REASONING.

I. Induction.

A. Have enough instances of the class under consideration been investigated to establish the existence of a general law?

B. Have enough instances been investigated to establish the probable existence of a general law?

II. Deduction.

A. Are both premises true?

B. Is the fact stated in the minor premise an instance of the general law expressed in the major premise?

III. Antecedent probability.

A. Is the assigned cause of sufficient strength to produce the alleged effect?

B. May some other cause intervene and prevent the action of the assigned cause?

IV. Sign.

A. Argument from effect to cause.

1. Is the assigned cause adequate to produce the observed effect?

2. Could the observed effect have resulted from any other cause than the one assigned?

B. Argument from effect to effect.

1. Do the combined tests of argument from effect to cause and from cause to effect hold?

V. Example.

A. Is there any fundamental difference between the case in hand and the case cited as an example?

 

FALLACIES.

A fallacy is an error in reasoning. The preceding part of this chapter has already suggested tests that will expose many such faults, but there are a few errors which, because of their frequency or their inadaptability to other classification, demand separate treatment. This book follows the plan of most other texts on argumentation, and treats these errors under a separate head marked fallacies. To detect a fallacy in another’s argument is to weaken, if not to destroy, his case; to avoid making a fallacy in one’s own argument means escape from humiliation and defeat. Hence, a knowledge of fallacies is one of the most essential parts of a debater’s equipment.

The classification given here does not pretend to be exhaustive; it does, however, consider the most common and insidious breaches of reasoning that are likely to occur, and the following pages should be studied with great care.

I. BEGGING THE QUESTION. (PETITIO PRINCIPII.)

1. MERE ASSUMPTION. Begging the question means assuming the truth of that which needs proof. This fallacy is found in its simplest form in epithets and appellations. The lawyer who speaks of “the criminal on trial for his life,” begs the question in that he assumes the prisoner to be a criminal before the court has rendered a verdict. Those writers who have recently discussed “the brutal game of football” without having first adduced a particle of proof to show that the game is brutal, fall into the same error. An unpardonable instance of question-begging lies in the following introduction, once given by a debater who was attacking the proposition, “Resolved, That the federal government should own and operate the railroads in the United States”:—

“We of the negative will show that the efficient and highly beneficial system of private ownership should be maintained, and that the impracticable system of government ownership can never succeed in the United States or in any similarly governed country.”

Private ownership and government ownership may possess these qualities attributed to them, but the debater has no right to make such an assumption; he must prove that they have these qualities.

2. ASSUMPTION USED AS PROOF. Such barefaced assumptions as the preceding usually do little damage except to the one who makes them. They are not likely to lead astray an audience of average intelligence; on the other hand, they do stamp the arguer as prejudiced and illogical. But when assumptions are used as proof, hidden in the midst of quantities of other material, they may produce an unwarranted effect upon one who is not a clear thinker, or who is off his guard. If, without showing that football is brutal, one calls it an extremely brutal game, and then urges its abolishment on the ground of its brutality, he has used an assumption as proof, and has, therefore, begged the question. The debater who stated, without proving, that vast numbers of unskilled laborers were needed in the United States, and then urged this as a reason why no educational test should be applied to immigrants coming to this country, furnished an example of the same fallacy.

3. UNWARRANTED ASSUMPTION OF THE TRUTH OF A SUPPRESSED PREMISE. The student is already familiar with the enthymeme. The enthymeme constitutes a valid form of reasoning only when the suppressed premise is recognized as true. Therefore, whenever an arguer makes use of the enthymeme without attempting to establish a suppressed premise whose truth is not admitted, he has argued fallaciously. This is a third method of begging the question. To illustrate: In advocating the abolishment of football from the list of college athletic sports, one might reason, “Football should be abolished because it obviously exposes a player to possible injury.” The suppressed premise in this case would be: All sports which expose a player to possible injury should be abolished. Failure to prove the truth of this unadmitted statement constitutes the fallacy.

4. ASSUMPTION EQUIVALENT TO THE PROPOSITION TO BE PROVED. It is not surprising that a man carried away with excitement or prejudice should make assumptions that he does not even try to substantiate, but that anyone should assume the truth of the very conclusion that he has set out to establish seems incredible. Such a form of begging the question, however, does frequently occur. Sometimes the fallacy is so hidden in a mass of illustration and rhetorical embellishment that at first it is not apparent; but stripped of its verbal finery, it stands out very plainly. The following passage written on the affirmative side of the proposition, “Resolved, That the college course should be shortened to three years,” will serve as a particularly flagrant illustration:—

It is a well-known fact that in the world of to-day time is an essential factor in the race for success. No young man can afford to dawdle for four long years in acquiring a so-called “higher” education. Three-fourths of that time is, if anything, more than sufficient in which to attain all the graces and culture that the progressive man needs.

It is evident that the “argument” in this case consists of nothing more than a repetition of the proposition.

5. ARGUING IN A CIRCLE. Another phase of begging the question consists of using an assumption as proof of a proposition and of then quoting the proposition as proof of the assumption. Two assertions are made, neither of which is substantiated by any real proof, but each of which is used to prove the other. This fallacy probably occurs most frequently in conversation. Consider the following :—

A. “The proposed system of taxation is an excellent one.”

B. “What makes you think so?”

A. “Because it will be adopted by the legislature.”

B. “How do you know it will?”

A. “Because it is a good system and our legislators are men of sense.”

This fallacy occurs when one proves the authority of the church from the testimony of the scriptures, and then establishes the authenticity of the scriptures by the testimony of the church. A similar fallacy has been pointed out in the works of Plato. In Phaedo, he demonstrates the immortality of the soul from its simplicity, and in the Republic, he demonstrates the simplicity of the soul from its immortality. The following fragment of a brief argues in a circle:—

I. This principle is in accordance with the principles of the Democratic party, since

A. The leader of the Democratic party believes in it, for

1. As the leader of the party, he naturally believes in Democratic principles.

 

II. AMBIGOUS TERMS. (EQUIVOCATION; CONFUSION OF TERMS.)

The fallacy of ambiguous terms consists of using the same term in two distinct senses in the same argument. Thus if one were to argue that “no designing person ought to be trusted; engravers are by profession designers; therefore they ought not to be trusted,” it is quite apparent that the term “design” means totally different things in the two premises. The same fallacy occurs in the argument, “Since the American people believe in a republican form of government, they should vote the Republican ticket.” Again:—

“Interference with another man’s business is illegal;

“Underselling interferes with another man’s business;

“Therefore underselling is illegal.”

J. S. Mill in his System of Logic discusses the fallacy of ambiguous terms with great care. In part he says:—

The mercantile public are frequently led into this fallacy by the phrase “scarcity of money.” In the language of commerce, “money” has two meanings: currency, or the circulating medium; and capital seeking investment, especially investment on loan. In this last sense, the word is used when the “money market” is spoken

1 ... 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ... 38

Free e-book «Practical Argumentation by George K. Pattee (books for new readers .txt) 📕» - read online now

Similar e-books:

Comments (0)

There are no comments yet. You can be the first!
Add a comment