The Categories by Aristotle (which ebook reader .TXT) 📕
- Author: Aristotle
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should be changes from either into the other, while the subject
retains its identity, unless indeed one of the contraries is a
constitutive property of that subject, as heat is of fire. For it
is possible that that that which is healthy should become
diseased, that which is white, black, that which is cold, hot,
that which is good, bad, that which is bad, good. The bad man, if
he is being brought into a better way of life and thought, may
make some advance, however slight, and if he should once improve,
even ever so little, it is plain that he might change completely,
or at any rate make very great progress; for a man becomes more
and more easily moved to virtue, however small the improvement
was at first. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he will
make yet greater progress than he has made in the past; and as
this process goes on, it will change him completely and establish
him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack of
time. In the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, however,
change in both directions is impossible. There may be a change
from possession to privation, but not from privation to
possession. The man who has become blind does not regain his
sight; the man who has become bald does not regain his hair; the
man who has lost his teeth does not grow a new set. (iv)
Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong manifestly
to a class which is distinct, for in this case, and in this case
only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the
other false.
Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of
correlatives, nor in the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, is
it necessary for one to be true and the other false. Health and
disease are contraries: neither of them is true or false.
‘Double’ and ‘half’ are opposed to each other as correlatives:
neither of them is true or false. The case is the same, of
course, with regard to ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ such as
‘sight’ and ‘blindness’. In short, where there is no sort of
combination of words, truth and falsity have no place, and all
the opposites we have mentioned so far consist of simple words.
At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed
statements are contraries, these, more than any other set of
opposites, would seem to claim this characteristic. ‘Socrates is
ill’ is the contrary of ‘Socrates is well’, but not even of such
composite expressions is it true to say that one of the pair must
always be true and the other false. For if Socrates exists, one
will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist, both
will be false; for neither ‘Socrates is ill’ nor ‘Socrates is
well’ is true, if Socrates does not exist at all.
In the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, if the subject does
not exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the
subject exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and
the other false. For ‘Socrates has sight’ is the opposite of
‘Socrates is blind’ in the sense of the word ‘opposite’ which
applies to possession and privation. Now if Socrates exists, it
is not necessary that one should be true and the other false, for
when he is not yet able to acquire the power of vision, both are
false, as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent.
But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject
exists or not, one is always false and the other true. For
manifestly, if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions
‘Socrates is ill’, ‘Socrates is not ill’, is true, and the other
false. This is likewise the case if he does not exist; for if he
does not exist, to say that he is ill is false, to say that he is
not ill is true. Thus it is in the case of those opposites only,
which are opposite in the sense in which the term is used with
reference to affirmation and negation, that the rule holds good,
that one of the pair must be true and the other false.
That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the
contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on.
But the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an
evil. For defect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary,
this also being an evil, and the mean. which is a good, is
equally the contrary of the one and of the other. It is only in a
few cases, however, that we see instances of this: in most, the
contrary of an evil is a good.
In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one
exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy
there will be health and no disease, and again, if everything
turns white, there will be white, but no black. Again, since the
fact that Socrates is ill is the contrary of the fact that
Socrates is well, and two contrary conditions cannot both obtain
in one and the same individual at the same time, both these
contraries could not exist at once: for if that Socrates was well
was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be one.
It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in
subjects which belong to the same species or genus. Disease and
health require as their subject the body of an animal; white and
black require a body, without further qualification; justice and
injustice require as their subject the human soul.
Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all
cases either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary
genera or be themselves genera. White and black belong to the
same genus, colour; justice and injustice, to contrary genera,
virtue and vice; while good and evil do not belong to genera, but
are themselves actual genera, with terms under them.
There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be
‘prior’ to another. Primarily and most properly the term has
reference to time: in this sense the word is used to indicate
that one thing is older or more ancient than another, for the
expressions ‘older’ and ‘more ancient’ imply greater length of
time.
Secondly, one thing is said to be ‘prior’ to another when the
sequence of their being cannot be reversed. In this sense ‘one’
is ‘prior’ to ‘two’. For if ‘two’ exists, it follows directly
that ‘one’ must exist, but if ‘one’ exists, it does not follow
necessarily that ‘two’ exists: thus the sequence subsisting
cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then, that when the sequence of
two things cannot be reversed, then that one on which the other
depends is called ‘prior’ to that other.
In the third place, the term ‘prior’ is used with reference to
any order, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in
sciences which use demonstration there is that which is prior and
that which is posterior in order; in geometry, the elements are
prior to the propositions; in reading and writing, the letters of
the alphabet are prior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case
of speeches, the exordium is prior in order to the narrative.
Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which
is better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority.
In common parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love
as ‘coming first’ with them. This sense of the word is perhaps
the most far-fetched.
Such, then, are the different senses in which the term ‘prior’ is
used.
Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet
another. For in those things, the being of each of which implies
that of the other, that which is in any way the cause may
reasonably be said to be by nature ‘prior’ to the effect. It is
plain that there are instances of this. The fact of the being of
a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that he is,
and the implication is reciprocal: for if a man is, the
proposition wherein we allege that he is true, and conversely, if
the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, then he is.
The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the
being of the man, but the fact of the man’s being does seem
somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition, for the
truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the
man’s being or not being.
Thus the word ‘prior’ may be used in five senses.
The term ‘simultaneous’ is primarily and most appropriately
applied to those things the genesis of the one of which is
simultaneous with that of the other; for in such cases neither is
prior or posterior to the other. Such things are said to be
simultaneous in point of time. Those things, again, are
‘simultaneous’ in point of nature, the being of each of which
involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is the
cause of the other’s being. This is the case with regard to the
double and the half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since,
if there is a double, there is also a half, and if there is a
half, there is also a double, while at the same time neither is
the cause of the being of the other.
Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and
opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be
‘simultaneous’ in nature. I mean those species which are
distinguished each from each by one and the same method of
division. Thus the ‘winged’ species is simultaneous with the
‘terrestrial’ and the ‘water’ species. These are distinguished
within the same genus, and are opposed each to each, for the
genus ‘animal’ has the ‘winged’, the ‘terrestrial’, and the
‘water’ species, and no one of these is prior or posterior to
another; on the contrary, all such things appear to be
‘simultaneous’ in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial,
the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into
subspecies. Those species, then, also will be ‘simultaneous’
point of nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are
distinguished each from each by one and the same method of
differentiation.
But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being
cannot be reversed. If there is the species ‘water-animal’, there
will be the genus ‘animal’, but granted the being of the genus
‘animal’, it does not follow necessarily that there will be the
species ‘water-animal’.
Those things, therefore, are said to be ‘simultaneous’ in nature,
the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at
the same time neither is in any way the cause of the other’s
being; those species, also, which are distinguished each from
each and opposed within the same genus. Those things, moreover,
are ‘simultaneous’ in the unqualified sense of the word which
come into being at the same time.
There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction,
increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place.
It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of
movement are distinct each from each. Generation is distinct from
destruction, increase and change of place from diminution, and so
on. But in
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